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Abstract
We examine insurance markets in which there are two types of customers: those who regret
suboptimal decisions and those who don’t. In this setting, we characterize the equilibria under
hidden information about the type of customers and hidden action. We show that both pooling
and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria that predict a
positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as in the standard
economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria that predict a
negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous
selection. Since optimal choice of regretful customers depends on foregone alternatives, any
equilibrium includes a contract which is not purchased.
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1

Introduction

The markets for annuities, long-term care insurance, and Medigap insurance have become increasingly important for societies whose population is aging, as e.g. in the US and Europe. Surprisingly,
the demand for these insurance products is very low (see e.g. Mitchell, et al., 1999, Brown and
Finkelstein, 2004) which might put a huge burden on future generations. Whether public or private
insurance provision is more eﬃcient depends on the underlying ineﬃciencies in these markets, a
large part of which is due to asymmetric information. Interestingly, those markets exhibit contrasting characteristics with respect to the relation between insurance coverage and risk type.
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show in their classical adverse selection model in insurance markets that, in equilibrium—if it exists—lower risk individuals self-select into contracts which oﬀer
lower insurance coverage. The model thus predicts a positive correlation between the amount
of insurance coverage and claim frequency. Similarly, economic models of moral hazard predict
this positive relation: individuals with higher insurance coverage reduce their investments in riskmitigating measures and thereby are of higher risk type. The empirical evidence, however, of the
relation between insurance coverage and claim frequency, is mixed. In the markets for acute care
health insurance and annuities the empirical evidence is consistent with the prediction of adverse
selection and moral hazard models (see e.g. Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000, Mitchell, et al., 1999,
Finkelstein and Porteba, 2004). In contrast, a negative relationship between insurance coverage
and claim frequency exists in the markets for term-life insurance, long-term care, and Medigap
insurance (see e.g. Cawley and Philipson, 1999, Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006, Fang, et al., 2006).
de Meza and Webb (2001) argue that a negative relationship between insurance coverage and
risk type—which they term advantageous selection—can be explained by hidden heterogeneity of individuals’ degree of risk aversion. They show that there exist equilibria in which high risk-averse individuals both purchase more insurance coverage and invest more in risk-mitigating measure—thereby
becoming lower risk types—than less risk-averse individuals. The empirical evidence, however, on
the sign of the negative relationship between degree of risk aversion and risk type is mixed. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) find evidence in the long-term care insurance market that is consistent
with advantageous selection, i.e. more risk averse individuals are more likely to purchase long-term
care insurance and less likely to enter a nursing home. In contrast, Cohen and Einav (2006) and
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Fang, et al. (2006) find the opposite in automobile and Medigap insurance: risk type is positively
correlated with risk aversion.
In this paper, we propose hidden heterogeneity in degrees of anticipatory regret as an alternative
reason for a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type. Regret is interpreted
as the anticipated disutility incurred from an ex-ante choice that turns out to be ex-post suboptimal
and individuals make their decision by trading oﬀ the maximization of expected utility of wealth
against the minimization of expected disutility from anticipated regret. The latter is modeled as a
second attribute to the utility function that depends on the diﬀerence in utilities of wealth levels
derived from the foregone best alternative and derived from the actual choice.
Our intuition suggests that individuals who consider ex-ante a disutility associated with ex-post
regret, i.e. with having foregone a better alternative, might both purchase less insurance coverage
under actuarially fair prices and invest less in risk-mitigating measures than individuals who do not
consider regret. We examine the existence and type of equilibria when insurers can neither observe
this preference heterogeneity nor investment behavior in risk-mitigating measures. We show that
both pooling and separating equilibria can exist. Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria
that predict a positive correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, as
in the standard economic models of adverse selection, but there also exist separating equilibria
that predict a negative correlation between the amount of insurance coverage and risk type, i.e.
advantageous selection. We derive the empirical prediction that advantageous selection is observed
if the cost of investing in risk-mitigating measures are relatively low and/or if the intensity of
anticipatory regret of relatively high. Another interesting empirical prediction relates to feature
of anticipatory regret that foregone alternatives, and thus the menu of insurance contracts oﬀered,
impact individual welfare. This implies that, in any equilibrium, a contract is oﬀered which is not
purchased.
Regret theory was initially developed by Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) and has
been shown in both the theoretical and experimental literature to explain individual behavior.
More recently, the impact of regret on decision making has been examined in diﬀerent scenarios.
Braun and Muermann (2004) and Muermann, et al. (2006) show that regret moves individuals
away from extreme decisions, i.e. regret leads to more (less) insurance coverage if insurance is
relatively expensive (cheap) and, similarly, regret leads financial investors to buy more (less) risky
3

stocks if the equity risk premium is relatively high (low). In a dynamic setting, Muermann and
Volkman (2006) show that anticipatory regret and pride can cause investors to sell winning stocks
and hold on to losing stocks, i.e. it can explain behavior that is consistent with the disposition
eﬀect. Regret preferences have also been applied to asset pricing and portfolio choice in an ArrowDebreu economy (Gollier and Salanié 2006), to currency hedging (Michenaud and Solnik 2006),
and to first price auctions (Filiz and Ozbay 2006).
In this paper, we contribute to the literature above by considering the equilibrium eﬀects under
asymmetric information in a market in which both types of investors coexist, those that consider
anticipated regret in their decision-making, and those that do not.
In the following section, we introduce the model and derive properties of indiﬀerence curves
as those will be used for our graphical analysis of equilibria in Section 3. In Section 4 we derive
comparative statics of model parameters with respect to the existence and type of equilibria. We
conclude in Section 5.

2

Model Approach

The model will focus on two types of individuals: those that regret suboptimal decisions, type R
individuals, and those that do not, type N individuals. Let λ be the fraction of type R individuals
in the population. Both types are endowed with initial wealth w and face a potential loss of size
L with initial probability p0 . Individuals can invest in self-protection at a disutility fi ∈ {0, F },
i = N, R, to reduce the probability of a loss from p (0) = p0 to p (F ) = pF < p0 . Type N individuals
maximize expected utility with respect to an increasing, concave utility function u (·). For type R
individuals, we follow Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982) by implementing the following
two-attribute utility function to incorporate regret in preferences
uR (W ) = u (W ) − g (u (W max ) − u (W )) .

(1)

Type R individuals thus maximize expected utility with respect to the utility function uR (·).1
The first attribute is the utility derived from the final level of wealth, W , and is thus equivalent
1

This two-attribute utility function is consistent with the axiomatic foundation of regret developed by Sugden
(1993) and Quiggin (1994).
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to the utility of type N individuals. The second attribute accounts for the fact that the individual
considers regret in his decision-making. Regret depends on the diﬀerence between the utility of
wealth, W max , the individual could have obtained with the foregone best alternative (FBA) and
the utility of actual final wealth, W . The function g (·) measures the disutility incurred from regret
and we assume that g (·) is increasing and convex with g (0) = 0. This assumption is supported in
the literature (Thaler, 1980, Kahneman and Tversky, 1982) and has recently found experimental
support by Bleichrodt et al., 2006.
Insurers are risk-neutral and oﬀer insurance contracts which are specified by the amount of
insurance coverage, I, and the premium rate, c, per dollar of coverage. We assume that there is
asymmetric information about both preferences and actions. That is, whether or not a specific
individual regrets his decision and whether or not he invests in risk-mitigating measures is private information to the individual. The insurer only knows the distribution of the two types of
individuals, N and R, in the population; that is, the insurer knows the parameter λ.

2.1

Investing in self-protection

The gains in expected utility for type i individuals, ∆i (I, c), i = N, R, from investing in selfprotection under an insurance contract (I, c) is

∆N (I, c) = (p0 − pF ) (u (w − cI) − u (w − L + (1 − c) I)) − F

(2)

for type N individuals and
∆R (I, c) = ∆N (I, c) − pF g (u (WLmax ) − u (w − L + (1 − c) I) + F )
+p0 g (u (WLmax ) − u (w − L + (1 − c) I))
max
) − u (w − cI) + F ) + (1 − p0 ) g (u (WNmax
− (1 − pF ) g (u (WNL
L ) − u (w − cI))

(3)

max are the wealth levels under the FBA in the Loss and No-Loss state, rewhere WLmax and WNL

spectively. As investing in self-protection only has ex-ante value to the insured, it is never optimal from an ex-post point of view to have invested in self-protection. In the No-Loss state, the
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FBA is thus to not have invested in self-protection and to not have bought insurance coverage, i.e.
max = w. In the Loss state, the FBA is to have bought the contract with the highest net coverage
WNL

˜
(1 − c̃) I˜ = arg max(I,c) (1 − c) I amongst the set of contracts oﬀered, i.e. WLmax = w − L + (1 − c̃) I.
³ ´
˜ c̃ denote the insurance contract with the highest net insurance coverage amongst the
Let X = I,

set of contracts oﬀered. Therefore

³ ³
´
´
∆R (I, c) = ∆N (I, c) − pF g u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (w − L + (1 − c) I) + F
³ ³
´
´
+p0 g u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (w − L + (1 − c) I)

− (1 − pF ) g (u (w) − u (w − cI) + F ) + (1 − p0 ) g (u (w) − u (w − cI)) .

(4)

The gains from investing in self-protection is larger for the type N individuals if the cost of
investing in self-protection, F , is high enough. More precisely, (4) implies that ∆N (I, c) > ∆R (I, c)
if and only if F satisfies the following inequality
³ ³
´
´
pF g u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (w − L + (1 − c) I) + F + (1 − pF ) g (u (w) − u (w − cI) + F )
³ ³
´
´
(5)
> p0 g u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (w − L + (1 − c) I) + (1 − p0 ) g (u (w) − u (w − cI)) .
To demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which there exists a negative relation between
insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection, we assume that the cost of investing
in self-protection, F , is high enough such that type R individuals will not find it optimal to invest
in self-protection under any contract, i.e. we assume a level of F such that ∆R (I, c) < 0 for all I
and c with pF ≤ c ≤ p0 .

2.2

Demand for insurance

Braun and Muermann (2004) have shown that type R individuals “hedge their bets” by avoiding
extreme decisions. That is, type R individuals purchase more (less) insurance coverage than type
N individuals if it is optimal for type N individuals to purchase very little (a lot of) insurance
coverage. This implies that type R individuals value insurance coverage relatively more (less) than
type N individuals if an insurance contract oﬀers very little (a lot of) coverage.
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2.3

Graphical analysis

We will use diagrams to analyze the existence of equilibria. In all diagrams, the x-axis represents
the individuals’ level of final wealth in the No-Loss state, WNL = w −cI, whereas the y-axis denotes
the individuals’ level of final wealth in the Loss state, WL = w − L + (1 − c) I. The individuals’
endowment point is (w − L, w) and labeled A. PF , P̄, and P0 denote the actuarially fair pricing
lines with respect to the premium rates c = pF ,c = p̄ = λpF + (1 − λ) p0 , and c = p0 , respectively.
Type N individuals. The levels of expected utility for type N individuals investing and not
investing in self-protection under contract (I, c) are

EUN (I, c, F ) = pF u (WL ) − (1 − pF ) u (WNL ) − F
and
EUN (I, c, 0) = p0 u (WL ) − (1 − p0 ) u (WNL ) .
The slope of type N individuals’ indiﬀerence curve are
dWL
1 − pF u0 (WN L )
|EUN (I,c,F ) = −
dWNL
pF
u0 (WL )
and
1 − p0 u0 (WNL )
dWL
.
|EUN (I,c,0) = −
dWNL
p0 u0 (WL )
The slope of the locus of contracts under which type N individuals are indiﬀerent between
investing and not investing in self-protection, i.e. for which ∆N (I, c) = 0, is given by
dWL
u0 (WN L )
.
|∆N (I,c)=0 = 0
dWN L
u (WL )
The line of those contracts is thus increasing and below the 45◦ line as 0 <

dWL
dWN L |∆N (I,c)=0

< 1.

Furthermore, for any premium rate c there exists a unique level of coverage I¯ (c) < L such that
¡
¢
N (I,c)
∆N I¯ (c) , c = 0. Since ∂∆∂W
< 0 we conclude that it is optimal for types N individuals
L

to not invest in self-protection under all contracts that are above the line of contracts for which
¡
¢
∆N I¯ (c) , c = 0. For all contracts below this line, it is optimal for type N individuals to invest in
7

¡
¢
self-protection. Note, that for all contracts with ∆N I¯ (c) , c = 0, indiﬀerence curves are kinked
with a steeper slope below than above as

¯ ¯
¯
¯
¯ ¯ dWL
¯
¯ dWL
¯
¯
¯
¯
>
|
|
¯ dWNL EUN (I,c,F ) ¯ ¯ dWNL EUN (I,c,0) ¯ .

Type R individuals. The level of expected utility of type R individuals not investing in selfprotection under contract (I, c) is
³ ³
´
´
EUR (I, c, 0) = EUN (I, c, 0)−p0 g u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (WL ) −(1 − p0 ) g (u (w) − u (WNL )) .
Note that the expected utility of type R individuals and therefore the shape of the indiﬀerence
³ ´
˜ c̃ that oﬀers the highest net insurance coverage. The
curves depends upon the contract X = I,

slope of type R individuals’ indiﬀerence curve is

dWL
1 + g 0 (u (w) − u (WNL ))
1 − p0 u0 (WNL )
³
³
´
´ < 0.
|EUR (I,c,0) = −
dWNL
p0 u0 (WL ) 1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
L

(6)

The second derivative of type R individuals’ indiﬀerence curve is given by
d2 WL
2 |EUR (I,c,0)
dWNL
µ
¶2 00
dWL
u (WL ) 1 − p0 u00 (WNL )
1 + g 0 (u (w) − u (WNL ))
³
³
´
´
−
= −
|EUR (I,c,0)
dWNL
u0 (WL )
p0
u0 (WL ) 1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
L
³ ³
´
´
µ
¶2
00 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
g
L
dWL
³ ³
´
´
|
u0 (WL )
+
dWNL EUR (I,c,0)
1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
L

+
> 0.

g 00 (u (w) − u (WNL ))
1 − p0 (u0 (WNL ))2
³
³
´
´
p0
u0 (WL ) 1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
L

Type R individuals’ indiﬀerence curve are thus also both decreasing and convex.
Comparison of indiﬀerence curves between types. We next compare the slopes of the
indiﬀerence curves of type R and type N individuals with contracts under which type N individuals
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invest in self-protection. The indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals are flatter than the one of
type N individuals if and only if
1 − p0
1 + g 0 (u (w) − u (WN L ))
1 − pF
³ ³
´
´≤
.
p0 1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
pF
L

(7)

At the endowment point A = (w − L, w) condition (7) is satisfied and the indiﬀerence
curve of type R individuals are thus flatter than the one of type N individuals. The eﬀect of
increasing the amount of coverage I at the same premium rate c on the left-hand side of condition
(7) is
⎛

⎞

1 + g 0 (u (w) − u (WNL ))

∂ ⎝
cu0 (WNL ) g 00 (u (w) − u (WNL ))
³ ³
´
³ ³
´
´⎠ =
´
∂I 1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
1
+
g
L
L
³ ³
´
´
(1 − c) u0 (WL ) g 00 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (WL ) (1 + g 0 (u (w) − u (WNL )))
+
³
³ ³
´
´´2
1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (WL )

> 0.

This implies that, for a given premium rate c and contract X =

³ ´
˜ c̃ , condition (7) can only
I,

switch once at the unique level of insurance coverage Iˆ = Iˆ (c, X). We thus conclude that for
low levels of coverage the indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals are flatter than the one of type
N individuals whereas for high levels of coverage the indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals can
be steeper than the one of type N individuals. This is consistent with the result of Braun and
Muermann (2004) who show that type R individuals value insurance coverage relatively more (less)
than type N individuals if an insurance contract oﬀers very little (a lot of) coverage. Valuing
insurance coverage relatively more (less) implies a flatter (steeper) indiﬀerence curve.
At the level I = Iˆ (c, X), the indiﬀerence curves or type R and type N individuals have the
same slope, i.e. condition (7) is satisfied with equality which implies
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d2 WL
2 |EUR (I,c,0)
dWNL
=

d2 WL
2 |EUN (I,c,F )
dWNL
+

>

+

µ

dWL
|
dWN L EUR (I,c,0)

¶2

³ ³
´
´
g 00 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (WL )
³ ³
´
´
u0 (WL )
1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (WL )

g 00 (u (w) − u (WN L ))
1 − p0 (u0 (WNL ))2
³
³
´
´
p0
u0 (WL ) 1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (W )
L

d2 WL
2 |EUN (I,c,F ) .
dWNL

The indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals at I = Iˆ (c, X) are thus more convex than the one of
type N individuals for all premium rates c and contracts X.
Changing the foregone best alternative. An interesting feature of regret is that preferences
depend upon foregone alternatives. In particular, insurance companies can change preferences of
˜ The
type R individuals by oﬀering a contract X with higher net insurance coverage (1 − c̃) I.
impact of increasing net insurance coverage of the foregone best alternative on the slope of the
indiﬀerence curve of R types is
∂
∂ (1 − c̃) I˜

µ

dWL
|
dWNL EUR (I,c,0)

¶

⎛
⎞
0 (u (w) − u (W
))
1
+
g
∂
NL
⎝
³ ³
´
´ ⎠ > 0.
=−
∂ (1 − c̃) I˜ 1 + g 0 u w − L + (1 − c̃) I˜ − u (WL )

This implies that the indiﬀerence curves of types R individuals become flatter at any contract (I, c).
The intuition is that increasing net insurance coverage of the foregone best alternative increases the
regret in the Loss-state and thereby makes coverage relatively more valuable to type R individuals.
This implies that oﬀering a contract with a higher net insurance coverage increases the level of
coverage I = Iˆ (c, X) at which condition (7) switches.

3

Equilibrium Analysis

We have shown that type R individuals might be both less willing to invest in self-protection and
prefer less insurance coverage than type N individuals. These results suggests that there can be
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equilibria in which there exists a negative relation between insurance coverage and risk type, i.e.
advantageous selection. We consider the following game between insurers and individuals:
Stage 1 Insurers make binding oﬀers of insurance contracts specifying coverage I and premium
rate c.
Stage 2 Individuals choose either a contract from the set of contracts oﬀered or no contract. If
the same contract is oﬀered by two insurers, individuals toss a fair coin.
Stage 3 Individuals choose whether or not to invest in self-protection.
We will consider the existence and type of pure-strategy, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria.
As examined above, regret introduces two interesting features. First, types R individuals value
insurance relatively more (less) than type N individuals if the level of coverage oﬀered is small
(large). Second, the foregone best alternative and thus the expected utility of type R individuals
depends on the set of contracts oﬀered. An insurance company could thus strategically oﬀer two
contracts: one contract, contract X, is only oﬀered to change the expected utility of type R
individuals and the other contract serves the purpose of attracting customers given the shift in
preferences of type R individuals. We can restrict our strategies to those where the “preferenceshifting” contract X oﬀers a higher net coverage than the other contracts oﬀered as only then type
R preferences shift. In our equilibrium analysis, we thus have to carefully examine those strategies.

3.1

Pooling equilibria

In this section, we examine the existence of pooling equilibria as a function of the level of coverage
oﬀered and via graphical analysis. The main result of this section is that, contrary to Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1976) and de Meza and Webb (2001), a pooling equilibrium can exist. As defined
above, contract (Iˆ (p̄, X) , p̄) denotes the contract with premium rate p̄ under which the indiﬀerence
curve of type R individuals have the same slope than the one of type R individuals and contract
¡
¢
I¯ (p̄) , p̄ denotes the contract with premium rate p̄ under which type N individuals are indiﬀerent
¡
¢
between investing and not investing in self-protection, i.e. ∆N I¯ (p̄) , p̄ = 0. As shown above,
both contracts are unique.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that the cost of investing in self-protection, F , is high enough such that
∆R (I, c) < 0 for all I and c with pF ≤ c ≤ p0 .
1. If Iˆ (p̄, X) ≥ I¯ (p̄) for some contract X, then there exists no pooling equilibrium.
¡
¢
2. If Iˆ (p̄, X) < I¯ (p̄) for X = (L, c0 ) where c0 is implicitly defined by EUN I¯ (p̄) , p̄, F =
¡
¢
EUN (L, c0 , 0), then the contract I¯ (p̄) , p̄ is the unique pooling equilibrium if and only if
¡
¢
(a) EUR I¯ (p̄) , p̄, 0 > EUR (I, p0 , 0) for all I

¡
¢
¡
¢
(b) EUN I¯ (p̄) , p̄, F > EUN (I, p̄, F ) for all I that satisfy EUR (I, p̄, 0) > EUR I¯ (p̄) , p̄, 0
¡
¢
(c) EUN I¯ (p̄) , p̄, F > EUN (I, p0 , 0) for all I with ∆N (I, p0 ) < 0

Proof. First note that no pooling equilibrium exists under which neither type R nor type N invest
in self-protection. Type N individuals prefer full coverage and type R individuals prefer partial
coverage as shown in Braun and Muermann (2004), i.e. for any pooling contract (I, p0 ) there exist
a contract to which either type R or type N individuals deviate. We can thus restrict our analysis
to all contracts (I, p̄) with I ≤ I¯ (p̄).
1. Suppose Iˆ (p̄, X) > I¯ (p̄) for some contract X. This implies for any pooling contract B = (I, p̄)
we must have I < Iˆ (p̄, X). We have shown above that for all I < Iˆ (p̄, X) the indiﬀerence
curve of type R individuals are flatter than the one of type N individuals, i.e. (7) is satisfied
(see Figure 1). This implies that no pooling equilibrium exist under those contracts as a
contract with slightly less coverage and a potentially diﬀerent premium rate (contract D in
Figure 1) attracts type N individuals but not type R individuals. Note that contract D does
not change preferences of type R individuals as it oﬀers lower net indemnity than contract
B. The intuition behind this result is that for low levels of coverage I < Iˆ (p̄, X) type R
individuals value insurance coverage relatively more than type N individuals and can thus
not be attracted by such contracts. This is equivalent to the proof in Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976) who show that under any pooling contract there exist contracts that attract low-risk
types but not high-risk types as high-risk types value insurance coverage relatively more.
Suppose Iˆ (p̄, X) = I¯ (p̄). Contract B = (Iˆ (p̄, X) , p̄) in Figure 2 cannot be a pooling equilibrium as the indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals at I = Iˆ (p̄, X) are more convex than the
12

one of type N individuals. This implies that there exists a contract with slightly less coverage
and a potentially diﬀerent premium rate which attracts type N individuals but not type R
individuals (contract D in Figure 2). Again, contract D does not change preferences of type
R individuals as it oﬀers lower net indemnity than contract B.
2. Suppose Iˆ (p̄, X) < I¯ (p̄) with X = (L, c0 ) where c0 is defined as above. Contract X (see
Figure 5) is the contract with the highest net insurance coverage such that neither type R nor
¡
¢
type N individuals will prefer X over I¯ (p̄) , p̄ . As argued above, any contract B = (I, p̄)
with I < Iˆ (p̄, X) cannot be a pooling equilibrium. Equivalently to above, the contract

B = (Iˆ (p̄, X) , p̄) is also not a pooling equilibrium (see Figure 3).
For any contract B = (I, p̄) with Iˆ (p̄, X) < I < I¯ (p̄), the indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals is steeper than the one of type N individuals, i.e. type N individuals value insurance
coverage relatively more than type R individuals (see Figure 4). A contract oﬀering slightly
more coverage and a potentially diﬀerent premium rate (contract D in Figure 4) attracts
type N individuals but not type R individuals. Note, however, that the introduction of contract D does not change the preferences of type R individuals as contract X oﬀers higher
net insurance coverage than contract D. Thus, no pooling equilibria B = (I, p̄) exist with
Iˆ (p̄, X) ≤ I < I¯ (p̄).

¡
¢
Now let’s examine contract B = I¯ (p̄) , p̄ (see Figure 5). Since Iˆ (p̄, X) < I¯ (p̄), the indif-

ference curve of type R individuals is steeper at B than the one of type N individuals. This
implies that there does not exist any contract (I, c) with ∆N (I, c) > 0 that attracts type N

individuals but not type R individuals. Condition 2a implies that any contract (I, c) with
∆N (I, c) < 0 must oﬀer a rate c < p0 to attract type N individuals and thereby make negative profits. Condition 2b ensures that no other contract (I, p̄) on the price line P̄ attracts
both types of individuals. Last, condition 2c implies that no contract (I, p0 ) on the price line
¡
¢
P0 attracts type R individuals. Therefore, B = I¯ (p̄) , p̄ constitutes a pooling equilibrium

under those conditions.

In the pooling equilibrium, type R individuals value insurance coverage relatively less than type
R individuals, i.e. the amount of insurance coverage must be relatively high. Oﬀering less coverage
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would be relatively more attractive to type R individuals and, under the conditions above, yield
negative expected profits. Oﬀering more coverage would induce type N individuals to not invest
in self-protection and also imply negative expected profits.

3.2

Separating equilibria

In this section, we examine the existence and type of separating equilibria. We assume that each
contract oﬀered and chosen by individuals must earn non-negative expected profits. We thus do
not allow for cross-subsidization between types as it is examined, for example, in Miyazaki (1977)
and Crocker and Snow (1985).
Under the assumption that type R individuals do not invest in self-protection, the contract
chosen by type R individuals in equilibrium is priced at the rate c = p0 and oﬀers the optimal
∗ = I ∗ (p , X), given contract X that oﬀers the highest net insurance coveramount of coverage IR
R 0
∗ (X) , p ). As shown by Braun and Muermann (2004)
age. Let us denote this contract by R = (IR
0
∗ (p , X) < L for
that the optimal amount of coverage at a fair rate is less than full coverage, i.e. IR
0

all X. As optimal amount of coverage depends on contract X, three contracts might be oﬀered in
separating equilibria: contract N and R chosen by types N and R individuals, respectively, and
the “preference-changing”contract X which is not chosen by any type of individual. In equilibrium, contract X must oﬀer the highest net insurance coverage such that neither type chooses the
∗ (p , X 0 ) , p ) is
contract. If a contract X 0 with lower net insurance coverage and thus R (X 0 ) = (IR
0
0

oﬀered then oﬀering contract X with higher net insurance coverage than X 0 together with contract
∗ (p , X) , p ) attracts type R individuals as the optimal amount of insurance coverage
R (X) = (IR
0
0

is increasing in the net insurance coverage of the foregone best alternative in the Loss-state.
In the following proposition we show that there exists a separating equilibrium under which
both types do not invest in self-protection and both types receive the optimal amount of coverage
given the rate c = p0 .
Proposition 2 Suppose that the cost of investing in self-protection, F , is high enough such that
∆R (I, c) < 0 for all I and c with pF ≤ c ≤ p0 . Then the two contracts N = (L, p0 ) and R =
∗ (p , X) , p ) constitute a separating equilibrium if and only if EU (L, p , 0) > EU (I, p̄, F ) for
(IR
0
0
0
N
N
∗ (p , X) , p , 0).
all I ≤ I¯ (p̄) that satisfy EUR (I, p̄, 0) ≥ EUR (IR
0
0
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Proof. Figure 6 illustrates the equilibrium. In this scenario, the “preference-changing”contract
X with the highest net insurance coverage coincides with contract N . The additional condition
outlined in the proposition assures that no pooling contract can attract both types of individuals
while making zero expected profits.
In the separating equilibrium outlined above, both types of individuals do not invest in selfprotection but purchase diﬀerent amounts of insurance coverage. The empirical prediction under
this scenario is thus that both types are of identical risk-type and that type R individuals purchase
less insurance coverage than type N individuals. The equilibrium contracts only separate diﬀerent
preference type individuals rather than risk type as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Note that
the premium rates for both types are the same. Thus, this type of equilibrium predicts that the
premium rate and coverage will be insignificant related in empirical studies.
3.2.1

Advantageous selection

In the following proposition, we show that there exist and characterize separating equilibria that
predict a negative relationship between insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. advantageous selection. As above, we denote the amount of coverage I¯ = I¯ (c) under which type N individuals are
¡
¢
indiﬀerent between investing and not investing in self-protection, i.e. under which ∆N I¯ (c) , c = 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the cost of investing in self-protection, F , is high enough such that
∆R (I, c) < 0 for all I and c with pF ≤ c ≤ p0 . Then the three contracts N , R, and X constitute
a separating equilibrium with advantageous selection if and only if under one of the following two
scenarios:
¡
¢
∗ (p , X) , p ) where
1. N = I¯ (pF ) , pF , X = (L, c), and R = (IR
0
0

¢
¡
(a) c satisfies EUN I¯ (pF ) , pF , F = EUN (L, c, 0) and c ≥ p0
¢
¡
∗ (p , X) , p , 0) ≥ EU
¯
(b) EUR (IR
0
0
R I (pF ) , pF , 0

¡
¢
∗ (p , X) , p ) where
2. N = I¯ (cN ) , cN , X = (L, c), and R = (IR
0
0

¢
¡
∗ (p , X) , p , 0)
(a) cN satisfies EUN I¯ (cN ) , cN , F = EUR (IR
0
0
15

¡
¢
(b) c is the maximum rate that satisfies both EUN I¯ (cN ) , cN , F ≥ EUN (L, c, 0) and
∗ (p , X) , p , 0) ≥ EU (L, c, 0), and c ≥ p
EUR (IR
0
0
0
R

¢
¡
¢
¡
∗ (p , X) , p , 0) ≤ EU
¯
(c) EUR I¯ (p̄) , p̄, 0 ≤ EUR (IR
0
0
R I (pF ) , pF , 0

¡
¢
∗ (p , X) , p , 0) = EU (I, p , F )
(d) EUN I¯ (cN ) , cN , F ≥ EUN (I, p0 , F ) where I satisfies EUR (IR
0
0
N
F
¢
¡
(e) EUN I¯ (cN ) , cN , F ≥ EUN (I, p̄, F ) for all I ≤ I¯ (p̄) that satisfy EUR (I, p̄, 0) ≥
∗ (p , X) , p , 0)
EUR (IR
0
0

Proof.
1. Figure 7 illustrates the equilibrium. Condition 1b represents the property that the indiﬀerence
curve of type R individuals through contract R crosses the locus of contracts ∆N (I, c) = 0
above the line PF . Contract N is then the best contract for type N individuals among the
set of contracts on PF that are not preferred by type R individuals over contract R. Contract
X = (L, c) is the contract with highest net coverage that is not preferred by either type over
their respective equilibrium contract. The condition c ≥ p0 assures that contract (L, p0 ) does
not attract type N individuals.
2. Figure 8 illustrates this equilibrium. Condition 2a defines contract N . Condition 2c represents
the property that the indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals through contract R crosses the
locus of contracts ∆N (I, c) = 0 below the line PF but above the line P̄. Conditions 2d and 2e
assure that type N individuals do neither prefer contract N 0 nor prefer any pooling contract
(I, p̄) that would also been taken by type R individuals over contract N .

The key factor that allows for separating equilibria with advantageous selection is the fact that
type R individuals prefer partial coverage at a fair rate. Type N individuals can separate themselves
from type R individuals with more insurance coverage since they value insurance coverage relatively
more at the fair rate. Both equilibrium 1 and equilibrium 2 in the above proposition have interesting
features.
In equilibrium 1, the presence of type R individuals in the market does not cause any neg¡
¢
ative externality on type N individuals. The equilibrium contracts N = I¯ (pF ) , pF and R =
16

∗ (p , X) , p ) are identical to the equilibrium contract under hidden action if there were only one
(IR
0
0

type of customers in the market. Equilibrium 1 is in fact the only equilibrium with that feature.
In equilibrium 2, insurance companies make strictly positive expected profits with contract N
while they break even with contract R. However, this is true only under pure separation and also
due to the fact that we do not allow for cross-subsidies between types. This implies that there exist
semi-separating equilibria under the conditions outlined in equilibrium 2 in which a certain fraction
of type R individuals choose contract N . The maximum fraction of those types is determined by
the break-even condition of insurance companies for contract N .
3.2.2

Adverse selection

In this section, we characterize the separating equilibrium that predicts a positive relationship
between insurance coverage and risk type, i.e. adverse selection.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the cost of investing in self-protection, F , is high enough such that
∆R (I, c) < 0 for all I and c with pF ≤ c ≤ p0 . Then the three contracts N = (IN , pF ), R =
∗ (p , X) , p ), and X = (L, c) constitute a separating equilibrium with adverse selection if and
(IR
0
0

only if
∗ (p , X) , p , 0)
1. (a) IN satisfies EUN (IN , pF , F ) = EUR (IR
0
0

(b) c is the maximum rate that satisfies both EUN (IN , pF , F ) ≥ EUN (L, c, 0) and
∗ (p , X) , p , 0) ≥ EU (L, c, 0), and c ≥ p
EUR (IR
0
0
0
R

¡
¢
∗ (p , X) , p , 0) ≤ EU
¯
(c) EUR (IR
0
0
R I (pF ) , pF , 0

¡
¢
∗ (p , X) , p , 0) =
(d) EUN (IN , p0 , F ) ≥ EUN I¯ (cN ) , cN , F where cN satisfies EUR (IR
0
0
¢
¡
EUR I¯ (cN ) , cN , 0
¢
¡
(e) EUN I¯N , pF , F ≥ EUN (I, p̄, F ) for all I ≤ I¯ (p̄) that satisfy
∗ (p , X) , p , 0)
EUR (I, p̄, 0) ≥ EUR (IR
0
0

Proof. Figure 9 illustrates this equilibrium. Condition 1a defines contract N . Condition 1c
precludes equilibrium 1 with advantageous selection in Proposition 3. Conditions 1d and 1e assure
that type N individuals do neither prefer contract N 0 nor prefer any pooling contract (I, p̄) that
would also been taken by type R individuals over contract N .
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Under the conditions outlined in the above proposition, the “advantageously selecting”contract
¡
¢
N = I¯ (cN ) , cN in Proposition 3 under equilibrium 2 is relatively too expensive such that type

N individuals prefer not to self-select into the contract with higher coverage but rather self-select
into the contract N = (IN , pF ) which oﬀers partial coverage at their respectively fair rate c = pF .

4

Comparative Statics

In this section, we discuss comparative statics of the model with regard to the types of equilibrium
examined in Section 3. In our model, the type of market equilibrium varies with cost of investing
in self-protection, F , the intensity of regret of type R individuals, as measured by the convexity of
g, and the fraction of type R individuals in the population, λ.

4.1

Cost of investment in self-protection

If the cost of investing in self-protection, F , is extremely high or low both types of individuals
optimally do not invest or invest in self-protection. Individuals are therefore heterogeneous only
regarding their preferences but not regarding their risk type. Thus, type N individuals optimally
obtain full coverage, whereas type R individuals optimally obtain partial coverage, as shown by
Braun and Muermann (2004).
Case 1 For very small (high) levels of F , it is optimal for both type R and type N individuals
to invest (to not invest) in self-protection and the unique equilibrium is a separating equilibrium
in which both types receive the optimal amount of coverage at the rate c = pF (c = p0 ), i.e. full
coverage for type N and partial coverage for type R individuals.
Suppose that the cost of investing in self-protection is in a range such that we obtain equilibria
under which type R individuals do not invest in self-protection but type N individuals do. As the
cost F increases, the set of contracts under which it is optimal for type N individuals to invest in
self-protection decreases, i.e. the locus of contracts ∆N (I, c) = 0 shifts down (see Figure 10 with
F1 < F2 < F3 ). We then derive the following comparative statics.
Case 2 Suppose that the cost of investing in self-protection, F , is high enough such that ∆R (I, c) <
0 for all I and c with pF ≤ c ≤ p0 .
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1. For low levels of F (e.g. F1 in Figure 10), condition 1b in Proposition 3 is satisfied - i.e. type
R indiﬀerence curve crosses ∆N (I, p0 ) = 0 line above the pricing line PF - and a separating
equilibrium with advantageous selection as in Figure 7 is obtained.
2. For medium levels of F (e.g. F2 in Figure 10), condition 2c in Proposition 3 is satisfied i.e. type R indiﬀerence curve crosses ∆N (I, p0 ) = 0 line below the pricing line PF - and a
separating equilibrium with advantageous selection as in Figure 8 is obtained.
3. For high levels of F (e.g. F3 in Figure 10), either a separating equilibrium as in Figure 9 or
a pooling equilibrium as in Figure 5 is obtained.

4.2

Intensity of regret

We measure the intensity of regret by the convexity of the function g. From the slope of type R
individuals’ indiﬀerence curve (see equation 6) we deduce that the more convex the g function is
the steeper the indiﬀerence curves of type R individuals are. Furthermore, a higher convexity of
the function g implies a lower level of optimal insurance coverage for type R individuals.2 Figure
11 illustrates the comparative statics with respect to the convexity of g (g3 is more convex than g2
which is more convex than g1 - thus R3 < R2 < R1 ).
Case 3 Suppose that the cost of investing in self-protection, F , is high enough such that ∆R (I, c) <
0 for all I and c with pF ≤ c ≤ p0 .
1. For highly convex functions g (e.g. g3 in Figure 11), condition 1b in Proposition 3 is satisfied
- i.e. type R indiﬀerence curve crosses ∆N (I, p0 ) = 0 line above the pricing line PF - and a
separating equilibrium with advantageous selection as in Figure 7 is obtained.
2. For medium levels of convexity of g (e.g. g2 in Figure 11), condition 2c in Proposition 3 is
satisfied - i.e. type R indiﬀerence curve crosses ∆N (I, p0 ) = 0 line below the pricing line PF
- and a separating equilibrium with advantageous selection as in Figure 8 is obtained.
3. For low levels of convexity of g (e.g. g1 in Figure 11), either a separating equilibrium as in
Figure 9 or a pooling equilibrium as in Figure 5 is obtained.
2

Alternatively, Braun and Muermann (2004) propose a “regret coeﬃcient” k in the utility function of type R
individuals such that uR (W ) = u (W ) − kg (u (W max ) − u (W )). They show that the higher the regret coeﬃcient k
the lower the optimal amount of insurance coverage under a fair premium.
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4.3

Fraction of type R individuals in the population

In Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), even the separating equilibrium does not exist if the fraction of
high risk type individuals in the population is too low. The reason behind this non-existence result
is that a pooling contract not only attracts high risk individuals but also low risk individuals as the
pooling premium rate is just slightly above the fair premium rate for low risk individuals. The same
reasoning applies to the separating equilibrium with adverse selection in Figure 9 if the fraction λ
of type R individuals is too low. Then both types of individuals are be better oﬀ under a pooling
contract. This pooling contract, however, does satisfy condition 2b in Proposition 1, which implies
that it cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), there does not exist
any equilibrium.
Interestingly, the same result does not hold under the conditions for the existence of a separating
equilibrium with advantageous selection.
Lemma 1 The existence of the separating equilibrium with advantageous selection as in Figure 7
does not depend on the level of λ.
Proof. Note that all conditions in 1 of Proposition 3 are independent of λ. Furthermore, for any
level of λ, no pooling contract attracts type N individuals (see Figure 7).

5

Conclusion

Economic models of moral hazard and adverse selection predict a positive correlation between the
amount of insurance coverage individuals purchase and their claim frequency. The empirical evidence on this prediction is mixed. In some markets, e.g. in the annuity and health insurance market,
such positive correlation is confirmed, whereas in other markets, e.g. in the life and long-term care
insurance market, the opposite relation holds. In this paper, we propose heterogeneous, hidden degrees of aversion towards anticipatory regret as a rationale for self-selection in insurance markets.
In our equilibrium analysis, we have shown that both pooling and separating equilibria can exist.
Furthermore, there exist separating equilibria of both types, advantageous and adverse selection.
We have characterized the conditions for each type of equilibrium and examined the comparative
statics with respect to the model’s parameter. Understanding the reasons behind advantageous
20

and adverse selection is highly relevant for the design of governmental policies aimed at reducing
ineﬃciencies due to informational asymmetries. This is particularly crucial for societies with aging
populations as the markets for annuities, long-term care insurance, and Medigap insurance become
increasingly important for them.
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ˆ type N individuals invest in self-protection, whereas
Figure 1: No Pooling Equilibrium for I < I:
type R individuals do not. Indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals is flatter at B than that of type
N individuals. Contract D attracts type N individuals but not type R individuals.
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Figure 2: No Pooling Equilibrium for I = Iˆ = I:
whereas R type individuals do not. Indiﬀerence curve of type R and type N individuals have the
same slope but are more convex at B . Contract D attracts type N individuals but not type R
individuals.
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Figure 3: No Pooling Equilibrium for I = Iˆ < I:
whereas type R individuals do not. Indiﬀerence curve of type R and type N individuals have the
same slope but are more convex at B . Contract D attracts type N individuals but not type R
individuals.
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Figure 4: No Pooling Equilibrium at Iˆ < I < I:
whereas type R individuals do not. Indiﬀerence curve of type R individuals is steeper at B than
that of type N individuals. Contract D attracts type N individuals but not type R individuals.
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¯ p̄): type N individuals are indiﬀerent between investing and not
Figure 5: Pooling Equilibrium (I,
investing in self-protection under B, type R individuals do not invest in self-protection. Indiﬀerence
curve of type R individuals is steeper at B than that of type N individuals and type R prefer
contract B over any contract on P0 . Note that contract D cannot be oﬀered to attract type N
individuals and induces them to not invest in self-protection and the company oﬀering D would
make losses.
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Figure 6: Separating Equilibrium: both types of individuals do not invest in self-protection and
receive their respectively optimal amount of insurance coverage.
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Figure 7: Separating Equilibrium with advantageous selection 1: type N individuals invest in selfprotection, whereas type R individuals do not. Type N individuals obtain more insurance coverage
than type R individuals.
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Figure 8: Separating Equilibrium with advantageous selection 2: type N individuals invest in selfprotection, whereas type R individuals do not. Type N individuals obtain more insurance coverage
than type R individuals.
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Figure 9: Separating Equilibrium with adverse selection: type N individuals invest in selfprotection, whereas type R individuals do not. Type N individuals obtain less insurance coverage
than type R individuals.
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Figure 10: Comparative statics with respect to F - F1 < F2 < F3 .
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Figure 11: Comparative statics with respect to intensity of regret - g3 is more convex than g2 which
is more convex than g1 .
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